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Financing Government Programmes in
Economic Downturn: A Comparative Analysis
Temltope Oshikoya~
Introduction
his paper examines the experience of Nigeria and other
countries in adjusting to lower oil prices and financing
programmes during economic downturn. The remainder of
structured as follows. Section 2 discusses oil price shocks since
I.

T

oil exporting
government
the paper is
2014 and its
impact on oil-dependent countries. Section 3 outlines government
programmes and examines specific policy adjustments related to draw-down
on reserves, oil revenue savings and sovereign wealth fund, exchange rate
depreciation, and expenditure adjustment including oil subsidy reduction or
removal. Section 4 discusses domestic budget financing sources including
revenue generation, domestic debt issuance via treasury bills and bonds, and
explores external financing sources such as private sector, bilateral, and
multilateral. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II.

Lower Oil Prices and Economic Downturn

Oil prices declined by more than 70.0 per cent from about US$115 in June
2014 to US$27 in February 2016, before recovering to the current US$42-52
price range per barrel in mid-2016. Since 1973, this level of negative oil price
shock could only be comparable to those of the 1980s, when oil prices fell
below US$10; and in 2008-2009, when it fell from around US$147 to about
US$40. According to the IMF, futures markets predict only a modest recovery
in oil prices from about US$45 a barrel at present to about US$5(HJS$55 a
barrel by 2020. The prospect of lower oil prices for longer period is
considerably influenced by a slowdown in global economic growth on the
demand side, and the U.S. shale supply and Iran's return to the world oil
market, on the supply side (IMF, 2016c).
The Economy and Lower Oil Prices
In oil-dependent countries, macroeconomic and financial developments are
closely linked with the price of oil. Figure 1 provides a schematic view of the
channels through which oil prices affect the economy. In oil-dependent
• Dr Temitope Oshikoya is the Managing Parlner at Nextnomics Advisory. He was previously the
Director General of West African Monetary Institute; Director, Economic Research, African
Development Bonk; Chief Economist, Africa Finance Corporation; and Group Head, Public
Sector, Ecobank Transnational Incorporation. The usual disclaimer applies.
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countries, public sector expenditures are negatively impacted by low oil
prices as fiscal revenues from oil decline. Economic activities in the no n-oil
sector slow down indirectly, as lower foreign exchange inflows reduce imports
for household consumption and business investment and private sector
confidence weakens. In the financial sector, credit and liquidity from the
banking sector are tightened as banks' balance sheets weaken due to rising
non-performing loans.
Figure 1
Economic Downturn: Learning to Live with Lower Oil Prices
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Jurtsdlcttonal Experiences of the MENA and CCA
Over half of the world's oil exporters are based in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) countries (Algeria, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates), and Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) countries (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan). As shown in Figure 2, the fiscal revenues and gross
domestic product of these countries are highly dependent on oil and other
hydrocarbon resources. According to the IMF (2016c) , lower oil prices
reduced hydrocarbon budget receipts by more than 10.0 per cent of GDP in
all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Algeria, and Azerbaijan
between 2014 and 2015. Kuwait was one of the hardest hit, with fiscal revenue
declining by a third, given that the oil sector contributes more than two-thirds
to its GDP and 80.0 per cent of its fiscal revenue. In Nigeria, while the non-oil
sector accounts for significant part of GDP, the oil sector plays a central role in
the economy, by contributing over 70.0 per cent of government revenues
until recently.
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Fig ure 2
Oil Dependence: Nigeria: 92% exports and 10% of GDP
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Economic Slowdown

Several oil~xporting countries registered negative growth rates in 2015 (Figure
3). There is no discernible empirical evidence to suggest that operating a free
floating market exchange rate or a rigid fixed exchange rate would have
prevented a recession in oil-exporting countries. The following countries have
not depreciated their exchange rates by much and some even maintained
fixed exchange rates, but still have negative GDP growth rates according to
trading economics(20l 5), Kuwait (-1.6 per cent), South Sudan (-5.3 per cent) ,
Libya (-6.0 per cent), Oman (-14.1 per cent), and Equatorial Guinea (-10.6 per
cent).
Figure 3

Economic Downturn in 0 :I Exporting Countries

Source: IMF
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Russia (-1.2 per cent), Brazil (-5.4 per cent), Venezuela (-7.1 per cent),
Kazakhstan (-0.2 per cent), Azerbaijan (-3.5 per cent), and Kyrgyzstan (-4.9 per
cent) have significantly depreciated their currencies, but still have negative
GDP growth rates year on year. With the Russian economy declining by 3.7
per cent in 2015, Sergei Guriev, an economic advisor to a former President of
Russia noted on CNBC that "the Russian economy is still very dependent on
oil prices. Even though Russia's central bank has moved to a floatingexchange-rate framework, Russia could not avoid the recession, given the
50.0 per cent drop in oil prices. The ruble depreciation buffered the shock
but could not have shielded the economy completely" (Ellyatt, 2014). Some
countries with large oil savings relative to GDP that pursued counter-cyclical
policies have managed so far, to avoid a recession irrespective of their
exchange rates regime. These include: Norway (0.7 per cent) with a free
floating exchange rate; Saudi Arabia (3.6 per cent) with fixed exchange rate;
and Algeria (3.9 per cent) with managed floating exchange rate.
Nigeria achieved a decade of robust growth, with annual real GDP growth
rate averaging 6.8 per cent a year up to 2014, driven by robust oil prices,
which reached a high of US$115 in July of that year, fueling high consumer
demand and encouraging capital flows, as well as the rise of the services
sector. From 6.3 per cent in 2014, economic growth declined significantly to
2.8 per cent in 2015; and contracted further by 0.4 per cent in the first quarter
and by 2.06 per cent in the second quarter of 2016. This was due to declining
oil prices which reached a low of US$27 in February, 2016, cut in oil production
by more than a quarter as a result of vandalism of oil pipelines, energy and
electricity shortages, and foreign exchange scarcity. Nigeria is already in a
recession but is expected to reach a trough in the third quarter of 2016, with a
projected positive growth in the fourth quarter. As a result, the economy is
expected to register a decline of -1.3 per cent in 2016, according to the
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2016-2020. The economy is
expected to pick up in the first half of 2017, growing at 3.0 per cent.
Inflation reached a high of 17.1 per cent in July, 2016, eroding consumers real
purchasing power. The rising inflationary pressure is due to structural and costpush factors, low industrial activities, high electricity tariffs, and the passthrough effects of the depreciation of the naira. Government's fiscal
balances moved from surpluses of 2.0 - 6.0 per cent of GDP in the past
decade to -1.8 per cent in 2014, and further widened to -3.7 per cent in 2015.
The 2016 budget sets expenditure at W6.08 trillion, with capital expenditure
accounting for 30.0 per cent of the total budgeted expenditure, from 10.0 per
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cent in 2015, with Wl.36 trillion for debt servicing, with a revenue projection of
W3.86 trillion and deficit of W2.22 trillion. Fiscal deficits widened due to lower oil
and non-oil revenues, huge fuel subsidy payments, and high debt service
ratio. In 2015, export fell by 40.0 per cent and is projected to fall further by 20.0
per cent in 2016. The current account balance turned negative at -2.4 per
cent in 2015. Gross international reserves declined from US$34.0 billion in 2014
to US$26.4 billion in June 2016, enough to cover 5 months of imports.
Ill.

Adjustment as Financing Instruments

Drawdown of Reserves, Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) and Fiscal Buffers
Several oil exporters with fiscal buffers in oil savings and SWF used them to
absorb the initial oil price shock and smoothen policy adjustment (Figure 4) .
The first line of defence has been to draw-down on foreign reserves, oil savings
and sovereign wealth funds. The GCC countries and Algeria have a
combined total of US$2.5 trillion in their sovereign wealth funds and other
savings vehicles based on estimates from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute
(SWFI). According to the IMF (2016c), several GCC and CCA oil exporters
have substantial fiscal space, with financial savings plus debt capacity
exceeding 10 years' worth of projected fiscal deficits. In some other countries
such as Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and
Turkmenistan, the estimated fiscal buffers can finance more than 20-30 years
of projected deficits. Their oil savings are more than 50.0 per cent of their GDP,
while that of Nigeria are less than 1.0 per cent of GDP.
Exchange Rate Polley Options In Oil Exporting Countries
The exchange rate regimes of oil exporters vary from fixed, managed, and
floating. The fixed exchange rate regime has been maintained by the GCC
countries, and has provided a useful nominal anchor in most of the
undiversified economies. This has been helped by the large fiscal buffers of

these countries. However, fiscal adjustment measures via direct spending
reduction and non-oil revenue increases will be needed to maintain the pegs
in the face of a persistent adverse external shock.
Flexible exchange rate regime, allows for depreciation of the exchange rates,
and can help smoothen fiscal and external adjustment, especially in countries
with more diversified economies. However, there are adverse effects
associated with higher inflation and financial stability risks due to currency
mismatches and unhedged borrowers especially in the context of dollarised
economies. While Algeria has adopted a managed exchange rate and
Kazakhstan has introduced substa ntially more foreign exchange flexibility,
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Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have managed their currencies more tightly
through interventions and administrative controls. With a flexible exchange
rate, currency depreciation raises the local-currency value of oil and other
exports and thereby boost short-term fiscal revenues. However, these revenue
gains can be negated by a proportional rise in government spending,
especially public wages. Nominal depreciation can also be offset by
inflationary pressures, which have been observed in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. Overall, the losses of foreign exchange reserves have been
smaller in the CCA region than in the GCC and Algeria, which allowed flexible
exchange rates as shock absorbers (IMF, 2016c).
Figure 4
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Source: IMF Algeria, Angola and Russia Article 4 Consultation Report
Note: 1st Line: Fiscal Buffers: Drawdown your reserves, oil savings and SWF; Nigeria's SWF
0.5% of GDP Vs. 40% in Algeria (GCC have $2.5 Trillion in Savings > $1 Trillion of
Projected Deficits)

The CBN had used various instruments in an attempt to meet multiple
objectives. The Bank has used both quantitative measures and exchange rate
adjustment in response to foreign exchange scarcity following the fall in oil
price since 2014. Some of the measures include restrictions on commercial
banks' FX trading, closing of the official FX auction window, and banning of 41
items from the official window. In September 2015, J.P. Morgan excluded
Nigerian domestic bonds from its local currency government bond indexes
due to FX liquidity issue. In order to stimulate the slowing economy, the CBN
expanded special intervention schemes while easing monetary policy rate
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and the cash reserve ratios implemented in November 2014 and May 2015
(IMF, 2016a).
In essence within the monetary policy trilemma, the CBN sacrificed inflation
and price stability for liquidity and growth, and exchange rate stability for
capital flows. As a result, foreign capital flows dried up and inflation rates rose
to 17.1 per cent. At its July 2016 MPC Meetings, the CBN made a 360-degree
change towards favouring capital flows while sacrificing growth with greater
exchange rate flexibility, hike in interest, and short-term interest rate measured
by the yields on Treasury Bills rising above 20.0 per cent.
Nigeria had devalued the naira twice in this oil down cycle, but has
maintained an official exchange rate since the first half of 2015. Following the
adoption of a flexible exchange rate by the Central Bank Nigeria (CBN) in
June 2016, the inter-bank rate of the naira depreciated by two-thirds from
W197 to US$1 to W316 to US$1 and stood at US$384 at the parallel market as at
2nd August, 2016. Demand for foreign exchange at about US$5.0 billion per
month far outstripped by five times the supply of only US$1 .0 billion.

Will a further devaluation by itself address the recession and current account
gap? The IMF estimates that Nigeria faces a current account gap of 1.5 to 2
per cent of GDP and a real exchange rate gap of about 15.0 - 20.0 per cent.
According to the IMF (2016) , over half of the gaps could have been c losed if
other macroeconomic policies, other than exchange rate adjustment, had
been at their desirable settings. "This provides a measure of the component of
the estimated overvaluation that would ideally be addressed by other policy
levers, leaving the remainder to be addressed through real exchange rate
adjustment, or, in the medium term, structural policies to improve
competitiveness. These dynamic s are illustrated by the inability of the 2014-15
devaluations to significantly alter the real effective exchange rate, which
points to the need for a package of supportive macroeconomic polic ies to
restore external sustainability" (IMF, 2016).
IV.
Government Ambitious Programmes and Limited Fiscal Space
In 2014, most MENA and CCA countries implemented fisc al stimulus measures,
including through off-budget vehicles. In 2015, fiscal expenditures slowed
substantially, and with sizable fiscal adjustment plans of 4-6 per cent of non-oil
GDP for 2016. Over time, all MENA and CCA oil exporters are expec ted to
adjust to the new reality of lower oil prices for longer, with fiscal adjustment of
5-7.5 per cent of GDP (IMF, 2016c). In terms of balancing fiscal budgets, GCC
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countries and Algeria, on average, require spending cutbacks by about onethird, while CCA oil exporters need about one-quarter.
Expenditure reduction is an important part of fiscal consolidation in several oil
exporting countries partly due to prior pro-cyclical policies with significant
increases during the episode of high oil prices. Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Saudi
Arabia have announced sizable cuts in public investment spending, while
Qatar continues to spend on key infrastructure ahead of the FIFA 2022 World
Cup (IMF, 2016c). The United Arab Emirates has reduced transfers to public
sector entities, subsidies, and grants. Kuwait is cutting recurrent expenditure,
while maintaining capital spending. Protecting public employment and
wages remains a major priority in most countries.

Subsidy and Energy Price reforms
Several oil exporters have adopted subsidy and energy price reform, with
increases in fuel and electricity charges from very low levels in these countries.
Saudi Arabia plans further price increases over time. the United Arab Emirates,
Oman, Qatar went further by introducing energy price adjustment
mechanisms that will align movement in domestic prices with international
benchmarks.
Non-oll Revenues
GCC countries do not have personal income taxes and are not planning to
introduce them any time soon. However, a GCC-wide value added tax (VAT)
has been announced and other fees, charges, and excises have been
introduced. Bahrain has started increasing a number of fees including
healthcare services while Oman has increased corporate taxes and fees.
Government delayed policy responses, especially those relating to
adjustment to the low oil price, which should have started from the fourth
quarter of 2014. The oil and gas sector has been marred by corruption,
inefficiencies, and fuel scarcity with long queues at petrol stations all over the
country. An announcement on subsidy removal was made in May of 2016. The
2015 budget was submitted within the electoral cycle and did not achieve
much. The Federal Government provided some fiscal relief for the state
governments. The 2016 budget was delayed by more than six months,
although it has the goal of stimulating the economy, while laying the
foundations for sustainable growth and development. The 2016 Budget
proposals of the Federal Government had W6.08 trillion in spending, with a
revenue projection of W3.86 trillion, resulting in a deficit of W2.22 trillion. A sum
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of W300 billion was budgeted for Special Intervention Programmes (FGN 2016
Budget Speech).
Capital expenditure : In 2016, capital expenditure was allocated 30.0 per cent

(W 1.8 trillion) of the budget, compared to less than 15.0 per cent (W557.0

billion) in 2015, but implementation take off has been slow, starting essentially
from the second half of the year. Significant resources have been committed
to critical sectors such as Works, Power and Housing - W-433.4 billion; Transport
- W202.0 billion; Special Intervention Programmes - W200.0 billion; Defence W134.6 billion; and lnterior-W53.1 billion. (FGN 2016 Budget Speech)
Recurrent Expenditure: The budget proposed a 9.0 per cent reduction in non-

debt recurrent expenditure, from W2.59 trillion in the 2015 Budget to W2.35
trillion in 2016, while budgeting W300 billion for Special Intervention
Programmes. The Efficiency Unit was set up, whic h along with the effective
implementation of Government Integrated Financial Management
Information Systems (GIFMIS) and Integrated Payroll and Personnel Information
System (IPPIS), is expected to reduce overheads by at least 7.0 per cent,
personnel costs by 8.0 per cent and other service wide votes by 19.0 per cent.
The MTEF and Budget: An average growth rate of 4.37 per cent was envisaged

for the economy in 2016, and was expected to increase to 4.8 per cent in
2017 and 5.2 per cent in 2018. The GDP growth rate was predicated on an oil
price benchmark of US$38 in 2016, and an average of US$49 in 2017-2018, as
well as oil production of 2.2 million barrel per day (mbpd) in 2016 and an
average of 2.27 mbpd for 2017-2018. The GDP growth rate was expected to
come from the non-oil sector with agriculture, including agro-allied business,
growing by 8.0 - 15.0 per cent over the period. In light of the weak
macroeconomic outturns described above, the GDP growth rate was revised
in the new MTEF to -1.3 per cent for 2016 and 3.0 per cent in 2017, with an
average growth of 4.4 per cent during 2018-2020. The new MTEF Oil price
benchmark of US$38 was maintained for 2016, but revised for 2017 and 2018
from US$42 and US$48 to US$48 and US$50, respectively. Oil output was revised
down to 1.7 mbpd for 2016 and 2.2 mbpd for 2017.
VI.

Domestic and External Financing

Debt Issuance: In several oil exporting countries, budget deficits are being

financed with a mix of asset drawdowns and debt issuance. Many
governments withdrew some of their deposits from the local banking system,
central bank, or sovereign wealth funds. In some cases, governments also
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borrowed from local banks. The use of international bonds (for instance, in
Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates-Abu Dhabi) and
syndicated loans (Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia) have been less frequent
until recently.
After significant withdrawal of financial savings last year, some countries may
issue more debt this year. The exact composition of financing is highly
uncertain, but if policymakers decided to finance half of their deficits by
issuing debt, the total issuance would reach close to US$ l 00.0 billion, given the
sizable projected deficits (IMF, 2016c).
The Sovereign Credit Ratings (SCR): The SCR of several oil exporters, including
Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have been revised down by
credit rating agencies, although most GCC countries still have ratings similar
to those of the best performing advanced economies, while their debt ratios
are typically below advanced economy peers. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
also have low debt ratios. In spite of rating downgrade, banks in most
countries have tapped foreign sources of funds. According to the IMF (2016),
in the GCC countries (excluding Saudi Arabia) and CCA oil exporters, the
increase in net foreign liabilities was about 5.0 per cent of GDP in 2015. In
Qatar, the increase was almost 10.0 per cent of GDP. Several countries,
notably Saudi Arabia, are also exploring partial privatisation of government

holding of public corporate assets as a temporary source of financing during
adjustment. Oman has raised US$ l .0 billion loan and US$2.5 billion Eurobond in
spite of its fixed exchange rate and negative GDP growth of 14.0 per cent,
while Qatar has raised US$9.0 billion triple-tranche bond.
Nigeria's fiscal deficit, equivalent to 2.16 per cent of GDP, brings the overall
debt to GDP ratio to 14.0 per cent of our GDP, well within acceptable fiscal
limits, but debt servicing at one-third of revenue is quite high. Government is
targeting fiscal deficits to GDP ratio of 1.3 per cent by 2018, with revenue
increases and overheads reduction. The 2016 deficit is planned to be
financed by domestic borrowing of W984 billion, and foreign borrowing of
W900 billion totalling Wl .84 trillion.
In 2016, oil and gas revenues are estimated at W820 billion. Non-oil revenues
would bring in Wl .45 trillion. Non-oil revenues, which include Income Tax (CIT),
Value Added Tax (VAT), Customs and Excise duties, and Federation Account
levies, have been below peers at about 30.0 per cent of total revenues and
5.0 per cent of GDP. The efficiency ratio of VAT collection is also below peers
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(Figure 5) . The contributions of independent revenues from MDAs are
projected up to Wl .51 trillion. The NNPC is exploring alternate funding models
that will enable it honour its obligations in Joint Ventures (JVs) and deep
offshore fields and to lower the burden that the traditional cash calls have
imposed on fiscal budget and foreign currenc y cash flows.
Figure 5
Nigeria's Weak Tax Collectmn
GDP Per Capita Vs E-Efflclency Ratio
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Figure 6 presents the cost and risk profile of existing public debt of the Federal
Government of Nigeria (FGN) as at the end of 2015. Figures 7, 8 and 9 show
the composition of domestic debt in terms of instruments and the sources of
external financing and their respec tive perc entage share as at the end of
2015. Acc ording to the OMO (2016), the implied interest rate (i.e ., weighted
average cost of debt) was high at 10.77 per cent, due mainly to the higher
interest cost on domestic debt. The portfolio is further characterised by a
relatively high share of domestic debt falling due within the next one year.
Figure 6
Policy Trade-Offs In Devising Deficit-Financing Strategies
• Drawdown of Own Resources
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Interest rate risk is high, since maturing debt will have to be refinanced at
market rates, which could be higher than interest rates on existing debt. The
foreign exchange risk is relatively low given the predominance of domestic
debt in the portfolio. A rise in short-term interest rates would increase the cost
of domestic debt, while further pressure in the foreign exchange market and
the resultant volatility would threaten the prospects of external financing and
capital inflows in the immediate term (DMO, 2016).
Figure 7
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Figure 9
• Domestic & External Borrowing
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The newly approved Debt Management Strategy prepared by the OMO and
approved by the Federal Executive Council (FEC) plans to introduce new
debt instruments. Retail bond, inflation-linked bond and Domestic Sukuk are
planned for the Domestic Bond Market, while Diaspora Bonds and
International Sukuk ore envisaged for the International Capital Market.
The Debt Strategy for 2016 to 2019 period favours rebalancing the public debt
portfolio in favour of long-term external financing with the objective of
reducing debt service cost and extending the maturity profile of debts. The
debt portfolio composition is, therefore, targeting a ratio of 60:40 for domestic
debt and external debt, as against the 84: 16 as at end 2015. The foreign
exchange rate risks that may arise will be mitigated by prioritising long-term
concessional borrowing for infrastructure projects. The debt strategy is also
aiming at a domestic debt mix of 75:25 for long and short-term debts from the
current 69:31 as at end 2015 to reduce the cost of debt service and roll-over
risk (OMO, 2016).
V.

Conclusion

The economies of Nigeria and other oil exporters have been hit by lower oil
prices with serious consequences for fiscal and current account balances,
economic growth and financing of government programmes. This paper
examined the experiences of other oil exporters in adjusting and financing
government ambitious programmes. These experiences were compared and
contrasted with the experience of Nigeria.
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Oil exporters in the MENA and CCA regions have used a variety of instruments
to adjust to major oil shocks and to financing their government programmes.
The first line of defence for major oil exporters was to partially drawdown their
oil savings and sovereign wealth funds to stabilise their economy and finance
government programmes. In contrast to Nigeria with oil savings funds of only
about 0.5 per cent of GDP, some of these countries had oil savings in excess
of 50 per cent of GDP, and that could finance up to 10 years and even 20
years of projected fiscal deficits.
The second line of defence has been to adjust exchange rate policies with
flexible and managed floating exchange rates, which serve as shock
absorbers. While most GCC countries have fixed their exchange rates, CCA
countries allowed their exchange rates to depreciate faster than Nigeria has
done. As part of the adjustment processes, government in oil exporting
countries have also adjusted expenditure on energy subsidy to conserve fiscal
resources. Some countries have also announced privatisation programmes to
raise revenues. GCC countries do not have personal income taxes; and are
not planning to introduce them any time soon, although a GCC-wide value
added tax (VAT) has been announced, and other fees, charges, and excises
have been introduced. Beyond these monetary and fiscal measures,
governments in oil exporting countries are borrowing both domestically and
externally from commercial sources, via Euro-bonds and other sources to
finance public sector programmes.
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